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Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute has been developing a pool-type sodium-cooled
fast reactor of the Prototype Gen-IV Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (PGSFR). To assess the
effectiveness of the inherent safety features of the PGSFR, the system transients during
design basis accidents and design extended conditions are analyzed with MARS-LMR and
the subchannel blockage events are analyzed with MATRA-LMR-FB. In addition, the in-
vessel source term is calculated based on the super-safe, small, and simple reactor
methodology. The results show that the PGSFR meets safety acceptance criteria with a
sufficient margin during the events and keeps accidents from deteriorating into more se-
vere accidents.
Copyright © 2016, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) design technologies have
been developed in Korea since 1997 under a National Nuclear
R&D Program to achieve an enhanced safety, an efficient uti-
lization of uranium resources, and a reduction of a high-level
waste volume. In 2015, the preliminary specific design of the
Prototype Gen-IV Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (PGSFR) was
completed, which is a pool-type SFR with the thermal power
of 392.2 MWt and uses metallic fuel of Ue10%Zr for a coree).
sevier Korea LLC on beha
mons.org/licenses/by-nchaving inherent reactivity feedback mechanisms and high
thermal conductivity.
Fig. 1 shows the overall configuration of the PGSFR, which
consists of the primary heat transport system (PHTS), the in-
termediate heat transport system (IHTS), the steam genera-
tors (SGs) including balance of plant, and the decay heat
removal system (DHRS).
The PHTS is placed in a large pool to make the system
transients slower, thus giving a higher probability to
terminate the abnormal events before they propagate intolf of Korean Nuclear Society. This is an open access article under
-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1 e Overall configuration of the Prototype Gen-IV Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor. AHX, natural-draft sodium-to-air heat
exchanger; DHRS, decay heat removal system; FHX, forced-draft sodium-to-air heat exchanger; IHTS, intermediate heat
transport system, SWRPRS, sodium water reaction pressure relief system.
Table 1 e Safety acceptance criteria for event category.
Event
category
AOO DBA
Class 1
DBA
Class 2
DEC
Fuel/cladding CDF*PAOO
< 0.05
Strain
<1%
CDFevent
< 0.05
Strain
<1%
Fuel T
<Solidus T
Clad T
<1,075C
Coolant T
<Boiling T
Coolant T
<Boiling T
AOO, anticipated operational occurrence; CDF, cumulative damage
function; DBA, design basis accident; DEC, design extended
condition.
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and the SGs. The IHTS transfers the reactor-generated heat
from the intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) of the PHTS to
the SG. The IHTS consists of two loops, and each loop has
two IHXs, one electromagnetic (EM) pump, one expansion
tank, and one SG. The SGs consist of two independent
steam-generation loops and convert the subcooled water to
a superheated steam. The DHRS with the heat transfer
capability of 10 MWt is composed of two units of passive
decay heat removal system (PDHRS) and two units of active
decay heat removal system (ADHRS). In addition, a damper
driven by the emergency diesel generator is attached to the
natural-draft sodium-to-air heat exchanger (AHX) and the
forced-draft sodium-to-air heat exchanger (FHX). The
damper is designed with the concept of the passive fail-
open type. The ADHRS has been designed to operate at
half capacity by the natural circulation, even if the EM pump
of ADHRS stops [1].
The fundamental approach to design a nuclear reactor
with safety is defense-in-depth. The multiple, independent,
and redundant means of the design assure the performance
of safety functions in normal operation and in accident
conditions. The cladding and end seals of fuel pin are the
first barrier to protect the escape of radiological material to
the environment. Table 1 shows the safety acceptance
criteria of the fuel and cladding for each event category. An
acceptance criterion for anticipated operational occurrences
(AOOs) and design basis accident (DBA) Class 1 is estab-
lished on the basis of cumulative damage function (CDF).
CDF is introduced as a measure to protect against rupture
due to thermal creep. A combination of temperature andduration limits is accepted as a design guideline in the sense
that it is derived from the CDF equation, which is a function
of time, temperature, and stress. CDF in MARS-LMR [2] can
be defined by Eqs. (1e3).
CDF ¼
Zt¼t
t¼0
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transient temperature (K), Ṫ is heating rate (K/s), activation
energy Q is 70,170 (cal/mol), and gas constant R is 1.986 (cal/
mol/K).
The acceptance criteria for DBA Class 2 and design
extended condition (DEC) are established based on tempera-
tures of pin melting and coolant boiling. In DEC events,
massive fuel melting is allowed as long as the molten core is
retained in vessel with a coolable geometry. In such a sce-
nario, the coolant temperature is an important factor instead
of the fuel or cladding temperatures, and it should be main-
tained below the sodium boiling temperature.
Based on the safety acceptance criteria as described in
Table 1, system transients are carried out to assess the
inherent safety features of the PGSFR. DBAs are analyzed with
a conservative deterministic evaluation method (a best-
estimate code and conservative inputs). DECs are analyzed
with a best-estimate deterministic evaluationmethod (a best-
estimate code and best-estimate inputs) supported by sensi-
tivity analysis.2. Modeling methodology
Fig. 2 shows the MARS-LMR nodalization for the preliminary
specific design of the PGSFR. The core is modeled by four
parallel flow channels such as hottest subassembly, fuel as-
semblies, nonfuel assemblies, and leakage flow. Active fuel
regions are axially divided into eight nodes. The PHTS is
placed in a large pool, which is divided into two temperature
zones. The four sodium-to-sodium decay heat exchangers
(DHXs) and two pumps are located in the cold pool, whereas
four IHXs are located in the hot pool to transfer the reactor-
generated heat from the PHTS to the SG. The IHTS consists
of the two IHXs tube side, piping, one EM pump, and one SG
shell side. The SG tubes are divided into a total of 30 nodes.
The SG inlet feed-water boundary region is adopted with a
constant mass flow-rate condition. In addition, the SG outlet
boundary region nearby high-pressure turbine is adoptedwith
a constant pressure condition. Each DHRS is modeled by
PDHRS and ADHRS, respectively. DHX is located and sub
submerged in the cold pool region and the sodium-to-air heat
exchanger is located in the upper region of the reactor build-
ing. The air boundary regions are imposed at the entrance and
the exit of this part.
The reactor shutdown system requires a mandatory pro-
tection system to prevent the deterioration of the plant from
all possible accidents. Table 2 lists the trip parameters and
the set points with uncertainties in the reactor protection
system.3. Design basis events
To evaluate the capabilities of the components having safety-
related functions under the accident situations, the analyses
of design basis events are performed for seven representative
events, which are a loss of flow (LOF), one-pump seizure (OPS),
a loss of heat sink by sodiumewater reaction (SWR), transient
overpower (TOP), the station black-out (SBO), PHTS pipe break,
and reactor vessel leak.Conservative assumptions are applied to the analysis of
the plant responses during the postulated DBAs, which are
102% of power condition with the ANS-79 decay power model
[3], considering the 5-second delay in opening of AHX and FHX
dampers and loss of offsite power (LOOP). In addition, one
PDHRS and one ADHRS are available in accordance with a
single failure criterion and maintenance.3.1. Loss of flow (bounding event of anticipated
operational occurrence)
LOF represents the loss of core cooling capability due to a
pumping failure of both PHTS pumps, which is a bounding
event of AOO. The imbalance between the reactor power and
the primary flow rate is a main safety concern in the LOF
event. To prevent the occurrence of the severe imbalance
between power and flow, the PGSFR is designed as the reactor
tripped by a high-power/flow parameter. Figs. 3 and 4 show
the peak clad midwall temperature and CDF behavior during
the LOF accident, respectively. The peak clad midwall tem-
perature rapidly increases after the pump trip at 0.0 seconds,
and then decreases nearly vertically after the reactor shut-
down by trip signal of the power-to-flow rate ratio. The tem-
perature rises due to both decreased mass flow rate by the
PHTS pump coastdown and the diminution of the heat
transfer to the IHTS by the isolation of the feed water due to
LOOP. If the DHX heat removal exceeds the core decay heat
power, the clad temperature can decrease continuously. In
conclusion, the CDF during LOF is calculated as 2.06  105 by
Eq. (1), which is much lower than 0.05 of an acceptance cri-
terion for AOO.3.2. One-pump seizure (bounding event of DBA Class 1)
OPS accident is a bounding event of DBA Class 1, which occurs
due to one PHTS pump seizure caused by a failure of me-
chanical bearing or electric motor. Fig. 3 shows the peak clad
midwall temperature. The temperature rapidly increases
because of seizure of one PHTS pump and coastdown of the
other PHTS pump due to LOOP. The peak clad temperature
drops rapidly after the reactor trip by a trip signal of the
power-to-flow rate ratio. Fig. 5 presents the comparison re-
sults of the core decay heat and heat removed by DHRS. The
DHX heat removal exceeds the core decay heat power at about
5,420 seconds and the core outlet temperature decreases
continuously. In conclusion, the CDF value is 1.13 103,
which is lower than 0.05 of a safety acceptance criterion for
the DBA Class 1 as shown in Fig. 4.3.3. Transient overpower (bounding event of DBAClass 2)
TOP accident is assumed to occur due to a single rod with-
drawal with a control rod stop system failure, which is a
bounding event of DBA Class 2. The event is initiated at 0.0
seconds, and a positive reactivity of 68.7¢ is inserted for 15
seconds. The core power rapidly increases due to the positive
reactivity insertion. The reactor trips at 2.22 seconds by a high
power-to-flow rate ratio parameter, and then the power
drastically decreases by the reactor trip.
Fig. 2 e MARS-LMR nodalization for Prototype Gen-IV Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor.
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Table 2 e Trip parameters and set points.
Parameter Set point (uncertainty)
High core outlet temperature 565C (±6C)
High core inlet temperature 410C (±6C)
High power-to-primary heat
transport system flow ratio
119% (±2.4%)
Steam generator shell
outlet temperature
359C (±6C)
Low hot-pool level 20 cm below 100% operating level
(±10 cm)
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Fig. 3 e Peak clad midwall temperatures at loss of flow and
one-pump seizure. LOF, loss of flow; OPS, one-pump
seizure.
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temperature during the TOP, pipe break, SBO, and vessel leak
accidents. In case of TOP, the peak temperatures of fuel, clad,
and coolant are calculated as 795C, 741C, and 724C, which
meet the safety acceptance criteria of DBA Class 2. The0 20 40 60 80 4,000 8,000 12,000
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Fig. 4 e Cumulative damage function (CDF) at loss of flow
and one-pump seizure. LOF, loss of flow; OPS, one-pump
seizure.coolant temperature has a sufficient safetymargin against the
boiling temperature as shown in Fig. 8.3.4. Station black-out
SBO is initiated by a simultaneous loss of both offsite power
sources and on-site power sources including emergency
diesel generator. The on-site emergency power supplies for
operation of EM pumps, blowers, and dampers of the DHRS.
ADHRS has at least 50% of heat removal capacity against a
complete loss of power. For this reason, the total heat removal
capacity of DHRS is about 3.75 MWt during the SBO accident.
Fig. 9 shows a comparison between decay heat removal rate of
the DHRS and a reactor power. Because total heat removal1 10 100 1,000 10,000
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Fig. 6 e Peak clad temperatures at design basis accident-II.
PB, pipe break; SBO, station black-out; TOP, transient
overpower; VL, vessel leak.
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others, it needs more time as the DHRS heat removal capacity
exceeds the core decay heat power at 11,740 seconds, and the
core outlet temperature is gradually decreased.3.5. Pipe break
The PHTS pipe break event is similar to the LOF accident.
This event indicates one pipe break connected between an
inlet plenum and PHTS pump. The flow through the broken
pipe is discharged into the cold pool, and some of the so-
dium of an intact pipe is also released into the cold pool.
The event is initiated at 0.0 seconds, and the PHTS and IHTS
pumps stop according to the assumption of LOOP at the
same time. Therefore, the residual heat removal is achieved250
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Fig. 8 e Coolant temperatures at transient overpower. IHX,
intermediate heat exchanger.only by SGs and DHRS. The peak clad temperature and fuel
temperature are shown in Figs. 6 and 7, which satisfy the
safety criteria of DBA Class 2. Fig. 10 shows a comparison
between the decay heat removal rate of the DHRS and
a reactor power. After 5,561 seconds, the amount of
heat removed by the DHX is higher than core residual heat
production, and the core outlet temperature decreases
continuously.
3.6. Reactor vessel leak
The reactor vessel leak is a typical accident of a sodium leak at
the PHTS boundary, which is assumed to occur at the bottom
of the reactor vessel conservatively. The size of leakage area is0
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Fig. 10 e Heat removal of decay heat removal system
(DHRS) at pipe break.
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accident is assumed to occur at 0.0 seconds, and the PHTS and
IHTS pumps stop according to the assumption of LOOP at the
same time. This accident is detected by a low-level parameter
due to the leakage flow through the reactor vessel. The
leakage flow rate during the accident is shown in Fig. 11. This
event mainly affects the level of sodium in the PHTS. The
sodium levels in the hot and cold pools are maintained at
levels above the inlets of IHX and DHX during transients as
shown in Fig. 12.3.7. Sodiumewater reaction
Sodium can rigorously react with water or steam. This
chemical reaction generates high-pressure waves and high-10.0
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Fig. 12 e Sodium levels at vessel leak. DHX, decay heat
exchanger; IHX, intermediate heat exchanger.temperature reaction heat. In the PGSFR, the SWR event can
occur due to the rupture of SG tubes. This event threatens the
integrity of the PHTS. Fig. 13 presents the MARS-LMR nodali-
zation to model the failure of heat removal function of one
IHTS loop due to the SWR event. The flow and pressure
boundary conditions are applied to the cold and hot legs,
respectively. To model the failure of the IHTS function, the
mass flow rate at the TMDP junctions (C391, C396, C491, and
C496) are set to zero. The total discharged time of the sodium
of the affected IHTS loop is conservatively assumed to be 5.0
seconds.
Fig. 14 presents the mass flow rate at the two IHTS loops.
The mass flow rate of the affected IHTS loop is linearly
decreased during the 5.0 seconds. Fig. 15 presents the com-
parison results of the core decay heat and heat removed by
DHRS. After 5,000 seconds, the heat removal exceeds the
decay heat. Considering the long-term cooling, the reactor is
normally cooled by the DHRS. The peak temperatures of the
fuel and cladding reach 744.2C and 691.6C at 5.4 seconds,
respectively, as shown in Fig. 16. It has a sufficient margin to
the safety criteria.4. Design extended condition
DEC events contain the anticipated transient without scram
(ATWS) in which the safety of PHTS is achieved by the
inherent reactivity feedback. The key phenomena in the DEC
event are the inherent safety characteristics, which should
maintain a balance between the reactor power and the decay
heat removal rate. In this study, ATWS events are analyzed
with a best-estimation approach using the MARS-LMR code.
The core is divided into individual flow groups, and nominal
values for design parameters are used with the ANS-94 model
for decay heat. Moreover, all four DHRS are available in DEC
modeling. To evaluate the inherent reactivity feedback
mechanisms, five reactivity feedback models, namely, fuel
Doppler, sodium density, fuel pin axial expansion, core radial
expansion, and control rod driveline and reactor vessel (CRDL/
RV) expansion, are taken into account. In addition, the diverse
protection system, which should be activated for ATWS
events, is neglected to demonstrate inherent safety
characteristics.4.1. Unprotected transient overpower
The reactivity insertion event could occur due to control rod
withdrawal or steam-line break. In this work, the unprotected
TOP event is assumed to occur by a single control rod with-
drawal with a reactivity insertion amount of US$0.3 for 15.0
seconds, considering the limit of the maximum insertion
amount by the control rod stop system. The change of the core
power is determined by reactivity feedback, and the CRDL/RV
expansion reactivity feedback has the highest negative reac-
tivity during this event as shown in Fig. 17. Although the peak
clad temperature in the hot subassembly rises to 674.6C near
the eutectic temperature, there is no clad penetration. The
peak coolant temperature in the hot subassembly has a suf-
ficient safety margin against the boiling temperature as
shown in Fig. 18. Therefore, the unprotected TOP event
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Fig. 13 e Schematic diagram to model the affected intermediate heat transport system (IHTS).
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to a severe accident.
4.2. Unprotected loss of flow
The unprotected loss of flow event is initiated with PHTS
pump failures. Based on the peak coolant temperature, the
two PHTS pump failures event is a bounding event. During the
event, the radial expansion reactivity acts as the highest0 10 20 30 40 8,000 10,000 12,000
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Fig. 14 e Mass flow rate of intermediate heat transport
system (IHTS) loops at sodiumewater reaction.negative reactivity as shown in Fig. 19. Because the peak clad
temperature is maintained higher than the eutectic temper-
ature, a clad penetration occurs. However, the clad thinning is
about 10.0 mm. The peak coolant temperature is 882.1C as
shown in Fig. 20. In addition, the peak coolant temperature
has a safetymargin against the sodiumboiling temperature as
shown in Fig. 20.
4.3. Unprotected loss of heat sink
The unprotected loss of heat sink event is initiated with fail-
ures of heat removal by SGs. Based on the peak coolant tem-
perature, the feed-water isolation event is a bounding event
due to a total loss of the SGs. During the event, the core radial
expansion affects the dominant negative reactivity, whereas
CRDL/RV is the dominant positive as shown in Fig. 21. In this
event, there is no clad thinning, because the peak clad tem-
perature is maintained below the eutectic temperature. In
addition, the peak coolant temperature is calculated as
623.5C, which has an enough margin against the boiling
temperature as shown in Fig. 22.
4.4. Internal blockage
A subchannel blockage could occur by the collection of
fragments or erosion substances formed in PHTS. The
blockage induces a large pressure drop, which decreases the
mass flow rate. Thus, the outlet temperature could be
significantly increased, and the accidents could lead to a
failure of the fuel cladding or local boiling. The large
blockages are extremely unlikely, because the inlet flow
modules of the PGSFR are designed to prevent large particles
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(DHRS) at sodiumewater reaction.
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PGSFR design adopts wire-wrap spacers, which can mini-
mize the possibility of trapping debris in the fuel assembly
region. Therefore, this study is focused on the number of
blocked orifice hole. The consequence of the blockage acci-
dent in a fuel assembly is analyzed with a subchannel
analysis code MATRA-LMR/FB [4]. Fig. 23 shows the clad
temperature according to the number of blocked orifice
hole. The maximum temperature appears at the end of
about 1,000 mm in an effective core. When two holes are
blocked among the six holes of the inlet orifice, the highest
temperature is calculated as 621C. If three orifice holes are
blocked, the maximum clad temperature is calculated as
664C. If four or more holes are blocked, a reactor protection0 20 40 60 80 8,000 10,000 12,000
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Fig. 16 e Peak fuel temperatures at sodiumewater reaction.signal provides the reactor trip by detecting the coolant
temperature. There is thus a very low possibility of the inlet
blockage accident proceeding to a severe accident.5. Source term evaluation
The source term (ST) is defined as the release of radionuclides
from the fuel and coolant into the containment, and subse-
quently to the environment. Because there are not much
experimental data or many years of experience about the ST
of metal fuel in SFR, the super-safe, small, and simple (4S)
reactor methodology [5] is applied on the preliminarily eval-
uation of the in-vessel ST in the PGSFR. This section presents0 50 100 150 50,000 100,000
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in-vessel ST.
The radionuclide groups are specified based on NUREG-
1465 ST [6] and Regulatory Guide 1.183 [7]. Radionuclides
with a half-life of more than 1 minute are considered. The
radionuclide groups and the elements are as follows:
1. Nobles gases: Xe and Kr
2. Halogens: I and Br
3. Alkali metals: Cs and Rb
4. Tellurium group: Te, Sb, and Se
5. Barium, strontium: Ba and Sr
6. Noble metals: Ru, Rh, Pd, Mo, Tc, and Co
7. Lanthanides: La, Zr, Nd, Eu, Nb, Pm, Pr, Sm, Y, Cm, and Am0 50 100 150 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000
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Fig. 20 e Sodium temperatures during the unprotected loss
of flow.8. Cerium group: Ce, Pu, Np, and U
9. Coolant: Na
The inventory of each radionuclide is calculated by the
ORIGEN-2 code using the realistic burn-up conditions. The
nominal value of the radiological inventory is multiplied by a
factor of 1.1 as an uncertainty margin to give the radiological
inventory.5.1. Release from the core to the primary sodium
ST during the release from the core to the primary sodium is
calculated based on the 4S methodology. In the noble gases0 100 200 300 400 50,000 100,000
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Fig. 22 e Sodium temperatures during the unprotected loss
of heat sink. CRDL/RV, control rod driveline and reactor
vessel.
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Fig. 23 e Peak clad temperatures according to the number
of orifice hole blocked.
Fig. 24 e Release fractions of sodium, NaI, and Cs from
coolant to cover gas.
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ups less than 1e2%; 100% of the fission gas is assumed to be
released instantaneously to the primary sodium on clad
failure.
In the halogens and alkali metals groups, although the
formation of CsI is possible for both types of fuel, the possi-
bility of retaining elemental I in the PGSFR fuel is made
extremely remote by the presence of uranium metal and
sodium (to form UI3 and Nal). In this calculation, no I is
retained in the fuel as UI3, 100% of the Cs inventory is
released from the fuel to the primary sodium as elemental Cs
(no Csl is formed), and 100% of I is released from the fuel to
the primary sodium.
In the Te group, the elements interact with the fuel bond
sodium to form Na2X compounds (e.g., Na2Te for Te). In this
calculation, 100% of the inventory in this group is involved in
this reaction with the fuel bond sodium. In the Ba and Sr
group, themelting points of Ba and Sr are higher than the peak
fuel temperature estimated for DBAs and most of the in-
ventory will be likely retained in the fuel. In this calculation,
100% of the inventory of this group is dissolved in the bond
sodium and released.
In the noble metals group, noble metals have melting
points that are significantly higher than that of the metallic
fuel. In this calculation, a release fraction of 0.1% is assumed.
In the Ce and lanthanides groups, the elements hardly react
with sodium and have low solubility. In this calculation, a
release fraction at 1% pin failure is estimated to be less than
0.001% at the fuel end of life.
5.2. Release from the primary sodium to cover gas space
ST during the release from the primary sodium to the cover
gas space is calculated using the assumption of the 4S meth-
odology. Fig. 24 shows the release fraction with sodium tem-
perature. For the assumed primary sodium temperature of
650C, the release fractions from the primary sodium to the
cover gas space are 3.7 106, 7.9 106, and 1.4 104 for
sodium, NaI, and Cs. In Te, Ba, and Sr; noblemetals; and in theCe and lanthanides groups, the elements have very small
saturated vapor pressure compared with sodium, halogens,
and alkali metals. In this calculation, the release fraction of
these elements should be as low as that of sodium or lower
(3.7 106).
Table 3 summarizes the results of the in-vessel ST in the
PGSFR by applying the assumption of the 4Smethodology. The
leakage from the cover gas to the environment through the
containment can be calculated using the in-vessel ST and the
design leakage rate.6. Conclusions
The consequences of the system transient during DBAs and
DECs for the PGSFR are analyzed with the MARS-LMR and the
local faults such as a flow blockage are analyzed with the
MATRA-LMR-FB to evaluate the integrity of fuel, cladding, and
coolant during the accidents. In addition, the in-vessel ST is
calculated based on the 4S methodology.
Conservative and best-estimated methodologies are
applied to DBA and DEC, respectively. The results of the DBAs
show that the PGSFR design meets safety acceptance criteria
with a sufficient margin and maintains its safety functions
required to mitigate the accidents. Through the analysis
result of DECs, the inherent safety characteristics of the
PGSFR from a negative reactivity feedback are identified, and
the ATWS results indicate an enough margin of sodium
boiling that can cause the core melt or disruptive accident.
Moreover, the result of a subchannel blockage event shows
that there is much low possibility for the event to extend to a
severe accident in the PGSFR design. Furthermore, the
progress of the preliminary evaluation on the in-vessel ST is
developed based on the 4S methodology. The final ST from
the cover gas to the environment through the containment
will be obtained using this in-vessel ST and the design
leakage rate in further work.
In conclusion, the preliminary specific design of the PGSFR
ensures safety margins for DBAs and it also accommodates
the DECs of ATWSs without further proceeding to a more se-
vere condition.
Table 3 e Results of the in-vessel source term in Prototype Gen-IV Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor.
Radionuclide group Elements In-vessel source term (g)
1% Failed
fuel pins
1 Melted
fuel assembly
Whole core melt
Noble gases Xe 4.39496 102 3.92470 102 4.39496 104
Kr 4.62520 101 4.13030 101 4.62520 103
Halogens I 2.39730 104 2.14079 104 2.39730 102
Br 2.07996 105 1.85741 105 2.07996 103
Alkali metals Cs 5.25273 102 4.69069 102 5.25273 1000
Rb 5.90118 103 5.26975 103 5.90118 101
Tellurium group Te 2.07916 104 1.85669 104 2.07916 102
Sb 2.35175 105 2.10012 105 2.35175 103
Se 2.61019 105 2.33090 105 2.61019 103
Barium, strontium Ba 5.24106 104 4.68027 104 5.24106 102
Sr 4.23429 104 3.78122 104 4.23429 102
Noble metals Ru 8.03944 105 7.17922 104 8.03944 102
Rh 1.89944 105 1.69620 104 1.89944 102
Pd 2.25723 105 2.01571 104 2.25723 102
Mo 1.25720 104 1.12268 103 1.25720 101
Tc 3.03901 105 2.71383 104 3.03901 102
Co 0.00000 1000 0.00000 1000 0.00000 1000
Lanthanides La 4.77959 107 4.26817 104 4.77959 102
Zr 3.21490 105 2.87090 102 3.21490 1000
Nd 1.40441 106 1.25413 103 1.40441 101
Eu 2.56746 108 2.29274 105 2.56746 103
Nb 2.06224 108 1.84158 105 2.06224 103
Pm 1.14719 107 1.02444 104 1.14719 102
Pr 4.33195 107 3.86844 104 4.33195 102
Sm 2.53532 107 2.26405 104 2.53532 102
Y 2.15475 107 1.92419 104 2.15475 102
Cm 3.07875 1012 2.74933 109 3.07875 107
Am 1.13605 1010 1.01450 107 1.13605 105
Cerium group Ce 1.05652 106 9.43475 104 1.05652 101
Pu 5.78650 106 5.16735 103 5.78650 101
Np 1.38801 107 1.23949 104 1.38801 102
U 2.87778 104 2.56986 101 2.87778 101
Coolant Na 2.67460 106 2.67460 106 2.67460 106
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